














of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant 
to Fichte	 (1987)	 didn’t	 only	 present	 a	 fresh	
account	of	German	philosophy	at	the	end	of	
the	18th	century,	but	it	also	introduced	a	new	
method	 of	 historical	 research.	 His	 more	 re-
cent	 works,	 starting	 with	 The German His-
toricist Tradition	(2011)	until	the	most	recent	
Weltschmerz: Pessimism in German Philoso-
phy, 1860–1900	(2016),	have	focused	on	the	
main	 currents	 of	 the	 19th	 century	 German	
philosophy.	 This	 is	 also	 the	 case	 with	 The 
Genesis of Neo-Kantianism.	 Spanning	 over	
more	 than	six	hundred	pages,	 this	book	 is	a	
major	 contribution	 to	 the	 history	 of	 an	 im-
portant	 philosophical	 movement	 that	 would	








of	 neo-Kantians	 that	 would	 be	 active	 from	
the	1870s.	Therefore,	 the	 focus	of	 this	book	
is	 on	 the	 history	 of	 neo-Kantianism	 before	






Kant’s	 philosophy”.	 Although	 heavily	 in-
debted	 to	 previous	 scholarship	 on	 this	 sub-
ject,	mainly	Klaus	Christian	Köhnke’s	 book	
Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus	
(1986),	Beiser	succeeds	in	providing	a	fresh	
account	 of	 the	 genesis	 of	 neo-Kantianism.	
He	challenges	the	widespread	prejudices	that	
the	 neo-Kantians	 were	 unimportant	 scholars	
locked	 up	 in	 their	 towers	 divided	 from	 the	
world,	 or	 that	 they	 were	 unoriginal	 thinkers	
who	 were	 just	 repeating	 what	 Kant	 had	 al-
ready	said.	One	of	the	most	innovative	theses	
of	 his	 book	 is	 that	 the	 movement’s	 origins	





Kant’s	 thought,	 his	 dualisms,	 and	 things-in-
themselves	against	 the	excessive	speculative	
idealism	of	Fichte,	Schelling,	and	Hegel	who	
tried	 to	 rehabilitate	 the	 dogmatic	 rationalist	
metaphysics	 of	 Spinoza,	 Leibniz,	 and	Wolff	
after	Kant’s	critical	project.
The	first	chapter	of	the	first	part	(pp.	23–88)	
is	 concerned	 with	 the	 philosophy	 of	 Fries	
who	 tried	 to	 base	 philosophy	 on	 empirical	
psychology,	 and	 epistemology	 on	 psychol-
ogy	 which	 could	 recognize	 the	 synthetic	 a 
priori	 but	 not	 prove	 it.	 His	 book	 Reinhold, 
Fichte und Schelling	 (1803)	 saw	 the	history	
of	philosophy	after	Kant	 as	 the	 “struggle	of	
rationalism	 to	 free	 itself	 from	 the	 limits	 of	
the	critique”.	In	his	political	philosophy	Fries	
was	an	anti-Semite,	but	gave	the	leading	role	
to	 public	 opinion	 which	 could	 correct	 even	
the	 ruler,	 although	he	encountered	problems	
in	 trying	 to	 reconcile	 his	 liberal	 views	 with	
the	 social	 injustice	 that	 liberalism	 created.	
Like	all	the	thinkers	of	the	lost	tradition,	Fries	
defended	 Kant’s	 dualisms	 against	 Schelling	
and	 Hegel	 whose	 organic	 conception	 of	 na-
ture	 he	 criticized	 because	 he	 saw	 it	 only	 as	
another	form	of	 the	mechanistic	explanation	
of	 nature.	 He	 also	 criticized	 Kant’s	 attempt	
to	 rationalize	 faith,	 and	 he	 introduced	 the	
concept	 of	 Ahndung,	 a	 kind	 of	 a	 feeling	 on	
which	religion	was	based,	and	through	which	
humans	 are	 aware	 of	 things-in-themselves.	









claim	 that	 reason	 deals	 with	 concepts	 (and	
not	existences),	as	well	as	Kant’s	dualism	of	





dationalism,	 and	 for	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 ego	
that	transcends	the	boundaries	of	experience	
and	 then	 relapses	 into	dogmatism	and	 falla-
cies	 of	 Spinoza,	 Leibniz,	 and	 Wolff.	 Beiser	
thinks	that	Herbart	didn’t	start	to	develop	his	
new	 system	 in	 his	 Swiss	 years,	 although	 it	
was	 then	 that	he	broke	his	 relationship	with	




his	manuscript	Zur Kritik der Ichvorstellung	





Around	 1802	 Herbart	 adopted	 a	 skeptical	
standpoint	from	which	he	attacked	Kantian–
Fichtean	idealism	and	the	Romantics,	but	he	
never	 rejected	 transcendental	 philosophy.	 In	
his	later	years	he	increasingly	identified	him-
self	 with	 Kant	 and	 was	 alienated	 from	 the	
prevailing	 currents	 of	 German	 philosophy.	
Thus,	 in	 his	 mature	 metaphysical	 writings	
he	defended	 the	synthetic	a priori,	unknow-
ability	 of	 things-in-themselves,	 and	 the	 ne-
cessity,	 as	 well	 as	 complementarity,	 of	 both	








tic	 empirical	 psychology.	 It	 was	 because	 of	
these	 criticisms,	 Beiser	 thinks,	 that	 Herbart	
was	(wrongly)	not	considered	a	Kantian,	but	
concludes	 that	 his	 project	 failed	 for	 similar	
reasons	as	 in	 the	case	of	Fries,	 for	 trying	 to	
base	epistemology	on	psychology.
Last	philosopher	who	belongs	to	Beiser’s	em-
piricist-psychological	 triumvirate	 is	 Beneke	





was	 therefore	 dubbed	 “neo-Kantian	 martyr”	
by	Beiser.	He	was	another	staunch	opponent	
of	 Romantic	 enthusiasm	 and	 neo-rationalist	
speculative	idealism,	as	well	as	a	radical	em-
piricist	 and	 an	 ally	 of	 the	 best	 that	 the	 new	
natural	 sciences	 could	 give.	 Accordingly,	




Kant’s	 claim	 that	 genuine	 self-knowledge	
is	 impossible,	but	defended	 the	 existence	of	
things-in-themselves	against	speculative	ide-
alists.	Beneke	tried	to	base	ethics	on	aesthet-
ics,	and	his	Grundlegung zur Physik der Sit-
ten	(1822)	is,	according	to	Beiser,	“one	of	the	







Beiser’s	 interpretation,	 for	 the	 breakthrough	
of	 neo-Kantianism.	 Political	 context	 which	
prepared	 such	 a	 breakthrough	 was	 the	 fail-
ure	 of	 the	 Revolution	 of	 1848	 which	 meant	
a	disaster	 for	 the	Hegelians	 in	Germany	but	
a	victory	for	the	neo-Kantians	who	were	de-
fenders	 of	 liberal	 ideals.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	











lastly	 Helmholtz,	 a	 formidable	 and	 famous	
scientist	who	thought	that	the	natural	sciences	






Beiser	 considers	 five	 major	 thinkers:	 Kuno	




to	eliminate	 the	 thing-in-itself	and	 the	ques-
tion	 of	 value.	 However,	 some	 of	 them	 have	
gradually	 distanced	 themselves	 from	 such	
views	 because	 of	 Schopenhauer’s	 growing	
success	 during	 the	 1860s,	 and	 because	 they	
wanted	 philosophy	 to	 be	 autonomous	 from	
psychology,	whose	possibility	could	be	prov-
en	only	by	transcendental	idealism.
Fischer	 is	 the	 first	 author	 to	 whom	 the	 first	





to	 be	 a	 Kantian.	 In	 his	 early	 work	 Diotima 
(1849),	Fischer	espoused	his	Hegelianism	or	
pantheism	 for	 which	 he	 was	 expelled	 from	
Heidelberg.	First	traces	of	his	Kantianism	are	
found	in	his	Logik und metaphysik oder Wis-
senschaftslehre	 (1852)	 where	 he	 claims	 that	
Hegel’s	 system	 “must	 be	 placed	 under	 the	
control	 of	 Kant”	 because,	 as	 Fischer	 recog-
nized	 in	 the	 late	1850s,	only	his	philosophy	
can	solve	the	problems	raised	by	Hegelianism	




the	time	of	his	Kritik der kantischen Philoso-


















he	 thought	 that	 the	 collapse	 of	 speculative	
idealism	was	“irreversible	and	final”	and	that	
philosophy	should	become	epistemology	and	
logic	 of	 special	 sciences.	 However,	 he	 un-






Third	 chapter	 (pp.	 283–327)	 of	 the	 second	
part	is	focused	on	Otto	Liebmann	whose	leg-
acy	 Beiser	 rehabilitates	 and	 defends	 against	









his	 interpretation)	 the	 thing-in-itself,	 whose	
existence	 he	 rejected,	 but	 he	 ultimately	 had	
to	admit	its	existence	and	his	failure	to	base	
philosophy	 on	 physiology.	 Beiser	 defends	




lation	 to	 then-contemporary	 development	 of	
natural	 sciences,	 criticized	Naturphilosophie 
of	Schelling	and	Hegel,	as	well	as	materialists	
and	positivists,	and	developed	epistemologi-









interpretation	 of	 Kant’s	 philosophy,	 and	 is	
discussed	in	the	fourth	chapter	(pp.	328–355).	




materialism”	 and	 “groundless	 spiritualism”	
whose	dispute	was	irresolvable	because	both	
had	 tried	 “to	 conceive	 the	 inconceivable”.	
Like	Fries,	he	criticized	Kant’s	rational	faith	
and	 encouraged	 subjective	 belief.	 In	 Kant’s 







populäre Aufsätze	 (1870)	 are	 neglected	 but,	
according	 to	 Beiser,	 “one	 of	 the	 best	 in	 the	
neo-Kantian	 pantheon”.	 In	 this	 work	 Meyer	
put	forward	his	thesis	that	philosophy	should	
become	 psychology,	 defends	 the	 possibility	
of	the	freedom	of	the	will,	and	advocates	its	
compatibilism	with	theism.	Another	two	im-
portant	 aspects	 of	 Meyer’s	 thought	 are	 his	
philosophy	 of	 religion,	 which	 he	 saw	 as	 an	
unalterable	 characteristic	 of	 human	 nature	
and	a	public	matter,	and	his	views	on	the	rise	
of	 scientific	 history	 which	 was	 a	 neglected	
topic	among	the	neo-Kantians.
The	last	thinker	of	this	transitional	period	of	
neo-Kantianism	 is	 Lange	 to	 whom	 the	 fifth	




und die Epigonen”,	 all	 of	 which	 advocated	
a	 return	 to	 Kant.	 However,	 he	 also	 argues	
(against	Ulrich	Sieg)	that	he	wasn’t	the	father	
of	Marburg	neo-Kantianism	nor	 the	 founder	
of	 neo-Kantian	 socialism	 (against	 Thomas	
Willey)	because	he	criticized	Kantian	reason-
ing	concerning	private	ownership	and	ethics,	

















reject	 the	 existence	 of	 things-in-themselves,	
his	interpretation	of	Kant’s	critical	project	on	














on	Lange	with	 the	observation	 that	 philoso-
phy	is	for	him	a	science	which	is	cut	off	from	




The	 last	 two	 chapters	 (pp.	 398–453)	 of	 the	
second	 part	 are	 devoted	 to	 pessimism	 and	
Darwinism,	 both	 of	 which	 became	 a	 sig-
nificant	 force	 in	Germany	 in	 the	1860s,	and	
would	 therefore	 challenge	 the	 neo-Kantian	
domination.	 Beiser	 follows	 Köhnke	 in	 his	
claim	that	pessimism	(whose	champions	were	




ter	 world	 is	 pointless”,	 but	 in	 their	 answer	
they	followed	Fichte,	not	Kant’s	strategy	es-
poused	in	his	Ideen zu einer allgemeinen Ge-
schichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht	 (1784),	
which,	 Beiser	 claims,	 was	 directed	 against	




on	 pessimism	 considers	 Schopenhauer’s	 es-
say	 Über die Universitätsphilosophie	 which	








with	 leftism	 and	 materialism	 at	 first.	 Lange	
embraced	 Darwinism	 and	 tried	 to	 connect	
it	 with	 his	 socialist	 views,	 although	 he	 was	
critical	of	some	of	Darwin’s	theories,	like	the	
natural	 selection	 as	 the	 only	 mechanism	 of	







to	 Ernst	 Haeckel’s	 Die Welträthsel	 (1899)	






first	 decade	 of	 “the	 neo-Kantian	 period	 of	
German	university	philosophy”	(1870–1900)	
or,	 more	 precisely,	 with	 the	 “new	 establish-
ment”	of	neo-Kantians	who	marked	the	final	
victory	 of	 epistemological	 interpretation	 of	
Kant:	 Hermann	 Cohen,	 Wilhelm	 Windel-




the	modern	 scientific	 age”,	 namely,	 as	 epis-
temology	or	 logic	of	 the	 sciences.	Although	
neo-Kantians	formed	an	uneasy	alliance	with	
positivism	 during	 the	 1870s,	 such	 alliance	








cussed	 in	 the	 first	chapter	 (pp.	465–491).	 In	
his	 early	 days	 he	 was	 an	 adherent	 of	 Völk-
erpsychologie,	but	in	the	summer	of	1870	he	






dental	 for	 Kant	 and	 the	 central	 role	 of	 the	
transcendental	 deduction	 in	 the	 first	 Kritik,	
although	 (ironically)	 Cohen	 denied	 Hume’s	
influence	on	Kant.	Beiser	challenges	the	view	
that	 early	 Cohen’s	 transcendental	 idealism	
is	“an	idealism	without	the	subject”	and	that	
Theorie	 is	 “the	product	of	Cohen’s	mystical	
Platonism”	 because	 he	 emphasized	 Kant’s	
rejection	 of	 intellectual	 intuition.	 In	 his	
groundbreaking	 book	 Cohen	 also	 responded	
to	 Lange	 and	 Trendelenburg	 and	 eliminated	
the	threat	of	materialism	which	both	have	left	
open.	The	 former	because	he	 thought	 that	a 
priori	forms	were	part	of	nature	and	the	lat-
ter	 because	 he	 presupposed	 the	 independent	
existence	of	matter	in	space.
Main	 topic	 of	 the	 second	 chapter	 (pp.	 492–
530)	is	the	concept	of	normativity	in	the	early	
works	 of	 Wilhelm	 Windelband	 who	 would	
become	 the	 father	 of	 Southwestern	 school.	
In	his	1881	 lecture	Windelband	put	 forward	
“his	 normative	 conception	 of	 philosophy”.	
According	to	him,	Kant	was	the	first	who	had	
explained	 “the	 possibility	 of	 knowledge	 not	











a	 critical	 philosopher	 makes	 an	 appraisal,	











impossibility	 of	 the	 thing-in-itself.	 In	 the	











The	 last	 chapter	 (pp.	 531–571)	 of	 Beiser’s	




phische Kriticismus	 in	 three	volumes	(1876,	
1879,	1887),	“one	of	the	classics	of	the	neo-
Kantian	 tradition”	whose	goal	was	 to	affirm	
the	 existence	of	 things-in-themselves	 and	 to	
reinterpret	Kant’s	philosophy	in	 the	spirit	of	
modern	 science.	Beiser	 challenges	 the	 com-











ject	 should	be	 the	content	of	 consciousness.	
By	realising	the	tensions	between	his	defini-
tion	of	philosophy	as	psychology	and	his	ad-
mittance	 that	 Kant’s	 project	 was	 essentially	
epistemological,	 Riehl’s	 conversion	 to	 Kant	
became	 complete,	 which	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	
first	 volume	of	Der philosophische Kriticis-
mus.	 In	 the	 first	 part	 he	 followed	 Cohen	 in	
reconstructing	 the	 historical	 Kant	 but	 gave	
much	more	importance	to	British	empiricism,	
through	which	he	criticized	positivists.	He	af-
firmed	 the	 version	 of	 realism	 which	 claims	
that	what	we	know	“of	reality	in	itself	is	only	
its	 existence,	 not	 its	 nature	 or	 essence”	 and	
which,	Beiser	 claims,	 corresponds	 to	Kant’s	
formal	 idealism.	Unlike	Cohen	 and	Windel-
band	 who	 claimed	 that	 the	 thing-in-itself	 is	
only	a	“goal	of	enquiry”,	Riehl	tried	to	prove	
its	existence	and	failed,	but	like	them	he	was	





temology,	 a	 servant	 of	 the	 natural	 sciences,	
but	practical	philosophy	as	a	noble	“guide	to	
life”,	 and	 practical	 philosopher	 as	 “a	 moral	
legislator	 and	 guide”.	 However,	 Beiser	 con-
cludes,	 Riehl’s	 big	 weakness	 was	 a	 huge	
divide	 between	 his	 theoretical	 and	 practical	
philosophy.
It	is	impossible	to	give	full	justice	to	profes-
sor	Beiser’s	bold	 attempt	 to	 sketch	 the	gen-





philosophical	 relevance	 mentioned	 above,	
definitely	 give	 his	 book	 the	 highest	 value.	






on	 theoretical	 philosophy	 which	 leaves	 his	
readers	with	an	impression	that	practical	phi-













cal	 deliberations.	 This	 is	 a	 false	 impression	
because	Beiser	completely	left	out	those	neo-
Kantians	whose	main	 field	of	 expertise	was	
practical	 philosophy.	 In	 the	 first	 place	 one	
should	mention	Austrian	philosopher	Robert	




















There	 is	 also	 an	 issue	 concerning	 Beiser’s	
lack	of	interpretations	and	a	conclusion	to	the	
book.	Although	there	are	many	places	where	
he	 engages	 in	 fierce	 debates,	 there	 are	 also	
many	places	where	he	just	reiterates	works	at	
length	without	discussing	their	philosophical	
importance	 or	 his	 own	 stance,	 for	 example,	
parts	 of	 Herbart’s	 metaphysics	 or	 Beneke’s	
rejection	of	universal	moral	principles.	Some	
of	 his	 interpretations	 are	 antiquated,	 which	
is	mostly	seen	in	his	interpretation	of	British	
philosophy.	 Thus	 he	 follows	 older	 scholars	
in	 claiming	 that	 Hume’s	 Treatise of Human 
Nature	 has	 an	 anthropological	 foundation,	
although	 most	 contemporary	 scholars	 agree	
that	Hume	is	thinking	of	philosophy	of	mind	





Smith	 (as	 if	 they	 held	 completely	 identical	
views),	or	their	“relativistic”	ethics	(pp.	164,	
171,	 282).	 Beiser	 has	 also	 left	 out	 detailed	
historical	connections	between	philosophers,	
like	 the	 reaction	 of	 speculative	 idealists	 to	
arguments	of	 the	“lost	 tradition”,	or	 the	fact	
that	some	neo-Kantian	philosophers,	like	Zel-
ler	 and	 Fischer,	 were	 also	 important	 for	 the	
philosophers	of	the	“new	establishment”	and	
were	 active	 during	 that	 time,	 which	 alters	
chronological	 structure	 of	 the	 book.	 Some-
times	it	seems	that	the	book	was	written	with	
an	 intention	 of	 being	 a	 contribution	 to	 con-
temporary	 Kant	 scholarship	 in	 the	 USA	 as	
much	as	a	historical	investigation.	However,	
this	doesn’t	have	to	be	an	issue	and	Beiser’s	
book	 doesn’t	 have	 to	 be	 read	 as	 a	 detailed	
historical	 study,	 but	 as	 a	 series	 of	 elegantly	
and	 seriously	 written	 philosophical	 portraits	
or	essays	which	are	connected	by	some	major	





contradiction	 is	 a	 constant	 tension	 between	











and	 some	of	 them	embraced	 sentimentalism	
or	virtue	ethics.	Similar,	but	minor	examples	
can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 chapter	 on	 Meyer	 who	
advocated	theism	but	adored	Voltaire	and	de-
ism	 (pp.	 348,	 351),	 or	 on	 early	Windelband	
who	 thought	 that	 logic	 should	 completely	





mous	 for	 his	 Grundriss der Geschichte der 
griechischen Philosophie	(his	most	important	
work	is	actually	Die Philosophie der Griechen 
in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung)	or	that	
the	Second	Reich	existed	already	 in	 the	 late	
1860s	 (p.	349).	Beiser	also	sometimes	men-
tions	important	facts	for	neo-Kantianism	but	
leaves	 them	 unexplained,	 like	 the	 Kantian	
school	of	orthodox	dogmatic	theologians	(pp.	
365–366).	 It	 should	be	noted,	 however,	 that	
those	are	rare	examples	in	Beiser’s	otherwise	
consistent	account.
The	 book	 itself	 is	 clearly	 and	 beautifully	
written.	 There	 are	 only	 a	 few	 mistakes	 like	
repeated	(“that	that”	/p.	158/	“upon	upon”	/p.	
488/)	 or	 dropped	 words	 (“[in]	 Lange’s	 later	
philosophy”,	/p.	362/).	There	are	some	prob-
lems	with	German	 language	and	 translation,	
for	 example,	 it	 should	 be Auflage der Ges-
chichte des materialismus,	 not	 Auflage des 
Geschichtes des materialismus	(p.	83),	Jahr-
hundert,	not	Jahr hundert	(p.	145),	der alles 
Zermalmende	(!)	means	the	all-crushing,	not	
the	 “old	 destroyer”	 (p.	 208),	 zweite Auflage	







and	 the	 design	 of	 the	 dust	 jacket	 stands	 out	
among	the	editions	of	the	Oxford	University	
Press.
It	 can	 be	 safely	 concluded	 that	 the	 positive	
aspects	greatly	outweigh	the	flaws	of	profes-
sor	 Beiser’s	 book	 which	 will	 become	 una-
voidable	for	anyone	who	wants	to	understand	
not	only	the	neo-Kantian	movement	but	also	
much	of	modern	philosophy	which	emerged	
from	the	ruins	of	speculative	idealism	in	the	
second	half	of	the	19th	century.
Matko Globačnik
